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گزارهی ممکن
From this it follows that all other apparent propositions are pseudo-propositions of various types and that all other uses of 'true' and 'truth' deviate markedly from the truth-by-correspondence (or agreement) that contingent propositions have in relation to reality.
, mathematical equations) are neither true nor false-we say that they are true or false, but in doing so we use the words 'true' and 'false' in very different senses from the sense in which a contingent proposition is true or false.
The demarcation between contingent propositions, which can be used to correctly or incorrectly represent parts of the world, and mathematical propositions, which can be decided in a purely formal, syntactical manner, is maintained by Wittgenstein until his death in 1951 (Zettel �701, 1947; PI II, 2001 Ed.
Given linguistic and symbolic conventions, the truth-value of a contingent proposition is entirely a function of how the world is, whereas the "truth-value" of a mathematical proposition is entirely a function of its constituent symbols and the formal system of which it is a part.
, calculations), while contingent propositions, being about the 'external' world, can only be decided, if at all, by determining whether or not a particular fact obtains (i.e.
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